Constitutional Law

Injury in fact (concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent), causation (injury fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct), and redressability (likely, not speculative, that a favorable ruling will redress it). Standing must be shown for each claim and each form of relief.

No. The plaintiff must suffer a concrete harm with a close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized as a basis for suit; Congress cannot create standing merely by granting a statutory right to sue (Spokeo; TransUnion v. Ramirez, 2021).

Generally no. Under TransUnion v. Ramirez (2021), a risk of future harm may support standing for injunctive relief if sufficiently imminent and substantial, but not a damages claim unless the risk materialized or itself caused a separate concrete harm.

No. A procedural right does not dispense with the injury-in-fact requirement; without concrete plans to use the affected area, Priya asserts only a generalized interest (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife; Summers v. Earth Island).

When (1) its members would otherwise have standing in their own right, (2) the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and (3) neither the claim nor the relief requires individual members' participation (Hunt). Diverting resources to oppose a policy is not itself an organizational injury (FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 2024).

Generally no, because the injury is shared and generalized. The narrow Flast v. Cohen exception allows Establishment Clause challenges to congressional exercises of the taxing and spending power, but not to discretionary executive spending (Hein) or tax credits (Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn).